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Impeachment of Witnesses by Prior Convictions
Pending Appeal
Almost all English-speaking jurisdictions permit the introduc-
tion of a witness's prior criminal convictions for the purpose of at-
tacking his credibility.' Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
sets forth the conditions for the admissibility of such evidence. 2 Rule
609(a) provides as a general rule that evidence of a witness's convic-
tions for crimes of a serious nature and certain crimes particularly
relevant to credibility, such as perjury, are admissible for impeach-
ment purposes. 3 While American jurisdictions were nearly unani-
mous in their practice of admitting evidence of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes at the time of enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, there was disagreement within both state and
federal jurisdictions regarding a collateral issue-the significance of
a witness's pending appeal from a conviction. The Federal Rules,
following the majority of state and federal courts, resolved the issue
for the federal courts in favor of admissibility. Rule 609(e) provides
that pendency of an appeal does not preclude use of the conviction
as impeachment evidence.4 The inclusion of this provision in the
Federal Rules was apparently not controversial, and the legislative
history of rule 609 provides little insight into the rationale for the
admissibility of convictions pending appeal.
Although the application of rule 609(e) presents few problems
of interpretation, the need for an explanation of the rule arises for
at least two reasons. First, it is unclear whether Congress's adoption
of rule 609(e) constituted a decision that the possibility of subse-
I 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 980, 986 (J. Cbadbourn rev. 1970). But see MoNT. R. EVID.
609 ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime is not admissible.").
2 In addition to the provisions of rule 609 discussed in this comment, the rule also covers
admissibility of convictions under various special circumstances. See FED. R. EVID. 609(b)
(convictions remote in time); FED. R. EviD. 609(c) (pardons, annulments, and certificates of
rehabilitation); FED. R. Evm. 609(d) (juvenile adjudications).
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted. . . but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. Evm. 609(a).
' "(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evi-
dence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible."
FED. R. Evm. 609(e).
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quent reversal engenders no significant problems. Neither the lan-
guage nor the legislative history makes clear what relief, if any,
should be granted when a witness's conviction is reversed on appeal.
Second, the lack of an explanation of rule 609(e) complicates and
limits its use as a model rule. The 1974 edition of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence5 employs the language of the Federal Rules, with few
changes, and several states have enacted codes of evidence that
follow the model of the Federal Rules." Yet, just as states disagreed
in the past over the effect of a pending appeal, some states that have
generally followed the model of the Federal Rules have chosen to
exclude rule 609(e) .7 Reluctance of some jurisdictions to adopt the
rule suggests that there may be something in the logic of impeach-
ment under the general theory of rule 609 that militates against the
admissibility of convictions pending appeal.
This comment attempts to set forth a rationale for rule 609(e)
that answers the questions on which Congress was silent. To this
end, after exploring the rationales of the federal and state cases that
constitute the "legislative history" of the rule, the comment exam-
ines the use of prior criminal acts to impeach witnesses and the
role of a conviction in proving such acts. Upon this framework, the
comment then explicates the justification for admitting convictions
as impeaching evidence notwithstanding a pending appeal and
considers the courses open to the courts should such a conviction
ultimately be reversed on appeal.
I. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS PENDING APPEAL: IN SEARCH
OF A LEGISLATIVE RATIONALE
Rule 609(a) permits an attack on the credibility of a witness
with "evidence that he has been convicted of a crime." 8 The role of
13 U.L.A. 197 (1975).
£ See generally, 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 609[081 (Supp.
1978) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE.] Two states have adopted rule 609 by
decisions of the states' supreme courts. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695
(1971); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1976).
ME. R. EvID. 609; NEB. Evm. R. 609(5).
FED. R. EviD. 609(a). Rule 609(a) gives the trial court no authority to exclude convic-
tions for crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement." FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). The rule
allows the court to admit convictions for other crimes only if it "determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." FED. R.
EvID. 609 (a)(1). See United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir.) (factors relevant to the
weighing of probative value and risk of prejudice), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). Note
that rule 609(a)(1) allows the court to consider the risk of prejudice only as it affects the
defendant. "Rule 609(a)(1) reflects a deliberate choice to regulate impeachment by prior
conviction only where the defendant's interests might be prejudiced by admission of evidence
of past crimes, and not where a nondefendant might suffer, or where a nondefendant witness
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a prior crime in impeaching a witness's testimony is to provide
circumstantial evidence of his insincerity from which the jury may
infer that he is generally untrustworthy. From this inference of un-
trustworthy character, considered together with other evidence rele-
vant to the witness's credibility, 10 the jury may further infer that the
witness is lying in his specific testimony. Although no empirical
study has demonstrated any significant correlation between a per-
son's prior crimes and his propensity to lie in court," rule 609(a)
complains of possible loss of reputation in the community." United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d
348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted). Cf. United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (impeachment of prosecution witness would have prejudicial effect on defen-
dant).
Two questions of the court's authority under rule 609(a)(1) remain unanswered. The first
is whether the court may prohibit impeachment of a nondefendant witness with a prior
conviction that has a prejudicial effect on the defendant. When the subject of impeachment
is a criminal defendant testifying on his own behalf, a danger arises that the jury will rely on
the evidence to determine not only the defendant's credibility, but also his guilt for the
offense for which he is charged. See H. KALvN & H. Zmsn, THE AMEmc JuRY 159-60 (1966);
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 43, at 89-90 (2d ed. E. Cleary gen. ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. The legislative history, reflecting this concern, sug-
gests that the court is to exercise its discretion only when the defendant himself is impeached.
See H.R. RE. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974) ("Such evidence should only be
excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by
persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record.")
(emphasis added). But see 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 6, 609[3a], at 78
("balancing approach of Rule 609(a) is not limited to defendant as a witness"). Weinstein
notes that in some cases a defense witness's prior crime will be held against the defendant.
For example, the jury might develop bias against a defendant when it hears of the prior crimes
of the defendant's relative, associate, or codefendant testifying on his behalf. Id. at 78-79.
The second unanswered question is whether rule 609(a)(1) authorizes the court to con-
sider the risk of prejudice to parties in civil actions. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to
civil as well as criminal trials, and rule 609(a)(1) does not expressly limit the scope of the
court's concern to protection of the criminal defendant. FED. R. EvID. 1101(b). The legislative
history, however, makes clear that Congress considered only the prejudicial effects of prior
crime evidence on criminal defendants. H.R. REP. No. 1597, supra, at 9-10 ("Such evidence
should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly ...convict[ing] the
defendant"). Admission of a prior conviction may have a prejudicial effect on parties to a
civil suit, see Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir.
1966); Chambers v. Robert, 110 Ohio App. 472, 166 N.E.2d 530 (1959), but it would be
anomalous to limit the balancing of prejudice and probative value to civil defendants. In a
civil case, jury prejudice is equally likely to develop against either a plaintiff or a defendant
whose testimony is impeached by evidence of his prior crime.
' See Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. REv. 498, 532-
35 (1939).
to See, e.g., FED. R. EvD. 608(a) (opinion and reputation evidence of character); FED. R.
Evil. 613(b) (prior inconsistent statement of witness). See generally HANDBOOK, supra note
8, §§ 33-50.
" Legal opinion about the strength of the correlation is divided. Compare 5 J. BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDIcIAL EVIDENCE 78-124 (London 1827); Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current
Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176-78 (1940) (correlation cannot be very strong) with Gertz
v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (Holmes, J.) and Hearings on Proposed Rules
of Evidence Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 251 (1973)
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reflects the Advisory Committee's assertion that "[t]here is little
dissent from the general proposition that at least some crimes are
relevant to credibility."'' 2 A conviction is a relevant piece of im-
peachment evidence because it is proof of the witness's guilt for a
crime, from which the jury may draw these inferences."3
Rule 609(e) applies rule 609(a)'s general rule of admissibility in
the specific case of a conviction pending appeal." The significance
of an appeal is that it may raise a question about the correctness of
the finding of guilt in the prior proceeding and thus bear directly
on the reliability of the conviction as evidence of the witness's crimi-
nal acts. Neither the language nor the history of rule 609(e), how-
ever, gives an adequate explanation of why this reduction in reliabil-
ity should not preclude the admissibility of convictions pending
appeal.
The "legislative history" of rule 609(e) is very brief. In contrast
to the controversy that surrounded the adoption of rule 609(a), 5 rule
609(e) received little attention during the process of drafting the
Federal Rules."8 The "legislative history" consists entirely of the
brief Advisory Committee Note on the rule and the practice of the
(testimony of Friendly, J.) ("[D]o you really think if you were on a jury, you would not like
to know if the witness had committed murder. I think I would like to know.").
,1 FED. R. Evm. 609, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 270 (1973). The use of a prior
conviction to impeach is an exception to the general rule barring evidence of prior crimes to
prove propensity to commit a particular act. See FR. R. EvD. 404(b). Prior crime propensity
evidence is part of the broader class of character evidence. Such evidence is generally inad-
missible because its relatively low probative value is outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice, confusion of issues, waste of judicial resources, and surprise to a party. HANDBOOK,
supra note 8, § 188; see FED. R. EviD. 403. See generally FEa. R. EviD. 404, Advisory Comm.
Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 219 (1973). In the case of a criminal defendant testifying on his own
behalf, the central risk is that the jury will find him guilty because of his prior criminal acts.
3 WoisTEm's EvwENc., supra note 6, 609[2], at 609-58. The inferences that the jury is
asked to draw for impeachment purposes differ from the inference that a person who has
committed a prior crime is likely to have committed the act in question. Rule 609 apparently
reflects a belief that prior crime evidence is sufficiently probative of credibility to overcome
the dangers that give rise to the general presumption against use of character/propensity
evidence.
,3 Ladd, supra note 11, at 176.
"FED. R. EVID. 609(e).
,5 See generally, 3 WmNsTm's EviDENcE, supra note 6, at 609-2 to 609-46.
"The rule appeared in its final form in the first draft of the proposed rules published
by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee. 46 F.R.D. 161, 295 (1969). The Advisory Com-
mittee published two revisions of its proposed rules before submitting them to Congress. 51
F.R.D. 315 (1971); 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973); several revisions of the proposed rules were made in
Congress. See generally 1 WENsTKm's EvmNcE, supra note 6, at vii-xii. Commentators on
the proposed draft gave it only brief consideration. See Glick, Impeachment by Prior Con-
victions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts,
6 CaM. L. BULL. 330, 346 (1970); Krauser, The Use of Prior Convictions as Credibility
Evidence: A Proposal for Pennsylvania, 46 TEMwLa L.Q. 291, 314 (1973). There is no record
of comment or debate on the rule in either house of Congress.
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state and federal courts prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules,
which that Note incorporates. The Advisory Committee Note states
that "the presumption of correctness which ought to attend judicial
proceedings supports the position that pendency of an appeal does
not preclude use of a conviction for impeachment."' 7 In support of
this assertion, the Note cites three federal court cases.'8 In the first
of these, United States v. Empire Packing Co.,'9 the Seventh Circuit
justified the rule by stating that a conviction remains valid during
the period of pendency: "Unless and until the judgment of the trial
court is reversed, the defendant stands convicted and may properly
be questioned regarding said conviction solely for the purpose of
testing credibility. '2 Subsequent decisions in other federal circuits
followed both the holding and stated rationale of Empire Packing,
which soon became the majority position. 2'
The cited federal cases share with the Advisory Committee
Note a paucity of analysis. The court in Empire Packing offered as
its authority the position of the majority of state courts that had
considered the issue. 2 The state courts approached the problem by
asking whether the term "conviction" in the respective state im-
peachment statutesm included convictions pending appeal. Almost
all the courts agreed an accusation or indictment would not suffice:
a conviction is that stage of a criminal prosecution at which the
witness is actually found to be guilty. 24 Under one line of cases," a
,7 FED. R. Evm. 609(e), Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 272 (1973).
" The note cites United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949), Bloch v. United States, 226 F.2d 185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 948 (1955), and Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1964).
" 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
Id. at 20.
21 United States v. Franicevich, 471 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Owens,
271 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 874 (1961); Bloch v. United States, 226
F.2d 185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 977 (1955); see Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d
968 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 975 (1964) (reaching the same result without deciding
the issue). Contra, Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
21 174 F.2d at 20.
23 The statutory authority to admit evidence of conviction to impeach witnesses origi-
nated in enactments that removed the common-law rule disqualifying testimony of persons
convicted of crimes. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 43, at 84-85. The New York provision is
typical: "A person who has been convicted of a crime is a competent witness; but the convic-
tion may be proved, for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony, either by cross-
examination, upon which he shall be required to answer any relevant question, or by the
record." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw R. § 4513 (McKinney 1963). See also N.Y. PENA LAw § 2444
(McKinney 1967) (similar statute governing criminal trials).
24 See cases cited in 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 987. See also HANDBOOK, supra note
8, § 43, at n.52.
2 See, e.g., People v. Braun, 14 Cal. 2d 1, 92 P.2d 402 (1939); People v. Ward, 134 Cal.
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jury's verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of the
state's impeachment statutes. 6 Other state courts, concerned that
errors in the jury's verdict in the first prosecution not harm the
accused in the second trial,2 have defined "conviction" as requiring
that the trial court in the prior proceeding have entered a final
judgment of conviction.3 But despite this disagreement, the major-
ity of both lines has relied on a technical distinction to hold that
the filing of an appeal suspends only the enforcement of the judg-
301, 66 P. 372 (1901); State v. Johnson, 141 Wash. 324, 251 P. 589 (1926). See also Common-
wealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1963).
" For example, one early decision, Manning v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 367, 123 P. 1029
(1912), explained that a jury verdict satisfied the statutory requirement of a conviction
because it removed the law's presumption that an accused is innocent and instead established
a presumption of guilt. The court explained this shift of presumption in terms of the trustwor-
thiness of a jury's verdict: "The law presumes that the jury was intelligent and impartial and
that they would not find a man guilty upon mere suspicion or an accusation of his enemies."
Id. at 370, 123 P. at 1030. The court's only concession to the possibility of jury error was that
the fact of an appeal or reversal could be shown on the witness's behalf.
Although the court in Manning invoked the reliability or "trustworthiness" of a criminal
jury verdict as its rationale for permitting use of convictions as impeaching evidence, it
failed to consider the significance of the pending appeal in light of this rationale. Manning,
like other cases equating "conviction" with a jury verdict, see note 25 supra, relies on the
formal distinction between the functions in a criminal trial: the jury decides whether the
accused is guilty and the court decides whether to give legal effect to a finding of guilty by
entering a judgment. See People v. Wood, 134 Cal. 301, 66 P. 372 (1901). Under this view,
although a guilty verdict is not necessarily sufficient proof of guilt after a trial or appellate
court has set aside the verdict, id. at 308-09, 66 P. at 374, a conviction is admissible during
the pendency of an appeal just as it would be if the court had not yet entered a judgment
based upon the jury's verdict. People v. Rogers, 112 Cal. App. 615, 297 P. 924 (1931).
7 The problem is most acute when the criminal defendant takes the stand in his own
behalf and is impeached with a prior conviction, since the risk is greatest in these cases that
a prior conviction will prejudice a litigant. See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of
Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961). Impeachment evidence is also admis-
sable, however, to impeach witnesses other than the defendant in criminal trials and all
witnesses in civil cases. Courts have generally limited the admissibility of convictions to
impeach in these cases with the same rules they have used for impeachment of criminal
defendants. See, e.g., Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 470 F.2d 99, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 905 (1978); Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Hackett v.
Freeman & Graves, 103 Iowa 296, 298, 72 N.W. 528, 529 (1897). But see note 8 supra.
1 See People v. Goff, 187 Colo. 57, 60, 530 P.2d 512, 513-14 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Finkelstein, 191 Pa. Super. 328, 156 A.2d 888, 892 (1959). This "final judgment" interpreta-
tion raises a problem with using a conviction during the pendency of an appeal, since the
effect of an appeal is generally to suspend the judgment. FED. R. App. P. 8; FED. R. CRIM. P.
38. Nonetheless, a majority of the states that read the impeachment statutes as requiring a
final judgment have held that a conviction pending appeal retains its status as a final judg-
ment until a higher court reverses it. Suggs v. State, 6 Md. App. 231, 236, 250 A.2d 670, 672-
73 (1969); Nicholson v. State, 254 So. 2d 881, 884 (Miss. 1971); Shaffer v. State, 124 Neb. 7,
10-11, 244 N.W. 921, 923 (1932). A judgment from which an appeal is pending thus satisfies
the requirement of a conviction for impeachment purposes. See Dickson v. Yates, 194 Iowa
910, 920, 188 N.W. 948, 952 (1922) (citing Hackett v. Freeman & Graves, 103 Iowa 296, 72
N.W. 528 (1897)).
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ment, not its status as a finding of guilt."
The difference between these two lines of state cases does little
to illuminate the legislative intent of rule 609(e). Several
courts-both state and federal 3 -following the majority rule of
admitting convictions pending appeal have failed to distinguish the
two approaches. And when the Seventh Circuit stated in Empire
Packing that the witness "stands convicted," it gave no clear indica-
tion whether this was due to the jury's verdict or the court's entry
of judgment.3 ' These cases represent a single approach in their reli-
ance on rules governing final judgments of conviction for purposes
other than use as impeachment evidence.32
One significant minority line of state and federal cases has held
that convictions may not be admitted as impeachment evidence
pending appeal. These courts have not taken the approach of deter-
mining whether the convictions satisfy a general statutory defini-
tion,33 but have responded to a special concern that the reversal of
a conviction after it is used to impeach is an undesirable result. The
District of Columbia Circuit first expressed this concern in a 1949
decision, Campbell v. United States.34 The court explained, "if the
Viberg v. State, 138 Ala. 100, 107, 35 So. 53, 55 (1903) ("the judgment of conviction
remained in full force and effect in so far as it was an adjudication of the guilt of the
defendant, for the purpose for which it was offered in evidence").
' See cases cited in note 21 supra. See also United States v. Allen, 457 F.2d 1361, 1363
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
3, 174 F.2d at 20.
See, e.g., People v. Spears, 83 Ill. App. 2d 18, 23, 226 N.E.2d 67, 69 (1967) (citing
Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1968)); People
v. Bey, 42 Ill. 2d 139, 146, 246 N.E.2d 287, 291 (1969) (appeal does not suspend conviction
for purposes of statute creating vacancy in public office upon conviction of incumbent);
Viberg v. State, 138 Ala. 100, 106, 35 So. 53, 55 (1903) (citing Ritter v. Democratic Press Co.,
68 Mo. 458 (1878)) (appeal does not affect common-law rule disqualifying convicted persons
as witnesses); Commonwealth v. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420, 422 (1868) (same).
m Other state courts have relied on the final-judgment interpretation of "conviction" to
hold convictions pending appeal inadmissible. E.g., Foure v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 620,
628, 283 S.W. 958, 962 (1926) ("an appeal in a criminal case suspends the judgment, which
does not become final until the termination of an appeal"); accord, Burford v. Common-
wealth, 179 Va. 752, 765, 20 S.E.2d 509, 514 (1942); Ringer v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 242, 246-
47, 129 S.W.2d 654, 656 (1939). These cases generally parallel the majority-rule cases to the
extent that they rely on cases regarding the suspension of convictions for purposes other than
impeachment. See Adkins v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. 1958) (citing City of
Pineville v. Collete, 294 Ky. 853, 172 S.W.2d 640 (1943)) (disqualification of public office
holders); Neal v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 239, 298 S.W. 704 (1927) (possession of intoxicating
liquors by one previously convicted of same offense)). They differ from the majority cases only
over the general rules governing final judgments, not the particular significance of a pending
appeal for the policies underlying use of convictions to impeach.
31 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Fenwick v. United States, 252 F.2d 124 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Beasley v. United States, 218 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
907 (1955).
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judgment of conviction is later reversed, the defendant has suffered,
unjustly and irreparably, the prejudice, if any, caused by the disclo-
sure of the former conviction." Finding this result to be "wholly
illogical and unfair," it held that a conviction was not admissible
to impeach a witness during the period of pendency." The concern
in Campbell, as well as in similarly decided state cases,37 is that the
defendant might have suffered a second conviction obtained largely
because the introduction of the first conviction (later reversed) dis-
credited his testimony.
The Advisory Committee Note to rule 609(e) makes clear that
the draftsmen had in mind the majority position of the federal cir-
cuits when they drafted the rule.3 8 The Note cites approvingly
Empire Packing and other federal court of appeals decisions that
adopted the state courts' majority rule; it explicitly rejects the ap-
proach of Campbell by citing it as "contra" the position of the rule.
To these citations the committee added only that the cited cases
support the "presumption of correctness which ought to attend" a
conviction. Thus, with merely a nod to the concern that a conviction
used to impeach be a reliable finding of guilt, the Note gives no more
insight into the concerns engendered by the pendency of an appeal
than we can glean from the reasoning of the majority-rule cases.
The difficulty with the majority-rule cases is that they do not
provide an explanation that would persuade most people skeptical
of rule 609(e). Although the implication from the disapproving cita-
tion of Campbell is that Congress rejected the protective policy on
which that decision was predicated, the majority cases simply do
not respond to the Campbell court's concern with the problem of
unfair prejudice from a subsequently reversed conviction. In decid-
ing whether a conviction pending appeal constitutes a "conviction"
for the purposes of impeachment statutes, the cases all begin by
defining "conviction" as some stage-either a jury's verdict or a
court's judgment-in the process of a criminal prosecution. Under
either definition, a conviction pending appeal satisfies the statutory
requirement, since the prosecution has reached the required stage.
The weakness of these cases is their failure to explain why a pending
appeal does not qualify the original definition of "conviction." An
appeal may call into question the "presumption of correctness" that
176 F.2d at 47.
3 Id.
*7 E.g., State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Mo. 1968); State v. Blue, 129 N.J.
Super. 8, 11-12, 322 A.2d 174, 176 (App. Div. 1974).
' FED. R. Evm. 609(e), Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 272 (1973); see text and
notes at notes 18-21 supra.
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justifies rule 609(a)'s rule of admissibility, yet the explanations of-
fered by the courts do not respond to the possibility that the appel-
late court might set aside the verdict for lack of sufficient evidence
or errors that otherwise make the finding of guilt less reliable .3
The explanations offered by the majority-rule cases are gener-
ally narrow exercises in statutory interpretation that resolve the
problem of a pending appeal without analyzing it. In the final-
judgment cases,40 the courts assumed that by stipulating
"conviction" the legislature meant the concept of final judgment in
its technical sense. Hence, they looked to rules formulated in other
contexts to determine whether a conviction pending appeal is a final
judgment. The jury-verdict cases similarly attach a technical defini-
tion to "conviction. ' 41 None of the statutes, however, says "final
judgment" or "jury verdict." They say only "conviction. 4 2 Nothing
in the language of the statutes suggests that the legislature intended
any particular resolution to the question why a verdict or judgment
that an appellate court might set aside nonetheless satisfies the
definition of "conviction." Even those cases, such as Manning v.
State, 43 in which the court has attempted to explain its decision with
respect to the policy underlying the statutory exception for admis-
sion of a conviction as evidence have failed to go beyond the general
rationale to face the specific problem of a pending appeal. 44
Although the various explanations offered by the majority-rule
cases constitute an unpersuasive justification and an inadequate
legislative history of rule 609(e), the general approach of the cases
seems correct. The issue of a pending appeal is merely supplemental
to the basic issue of admissibility of conviction evidence for the
purpose of impeachment. The crucial question is thus whether a
conviction pending appeal satisfies the policy underlying the admis-
sibility of prior convictions as impeaching evidence.
See text and notes at notes 64-73 infra.
, E.g., People v. Spears, 83 111. App. 2d 18, 226 N.E.2d 67 (1967); see text and note at
note 32 supra.
11 See, e.g., People v. Braun, 14 Cal. 2d 1, 92 P.2d 402 (1939); People v. Ward, 134 Cal.
301, 66 P.372 (1901).
,2 The language of the Texas statute is slightly different. It stipulates "final conviction."
TEXAS CODE CRmI. PRO. ANN. art. 38.29 (Vernon 1966). The Texas courts have interpreted this
to exclude any conviction pending appeal. See, e.g., Ringer v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 242, 246-
47, 129 S.W.2d 654, 656 (1939).
4 7 Okla. Crim. 367, 370, 123 P. 1029, 1030 (1912).
U See text and notes at notes 25-26 supra.
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II. CONVICTION AS CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF A WITNESS'S PRIOR CRIME
A. Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Crimes
1. Rule 608(b). Impeachment of a witness's credibility by
means of prior crime evidence falls within the scope of rule 608(b),
which permits a cross-examiner to inquire into "specific instances
of conduct" of a witness "for the purpose of attacking or supporting
his credibility," if the court finds such inquiry sufficiently probative
of that issue.45 Rule 608(b) allows questions about a witness's prior
crimes, whether or not they have resulted in conviction, but prohib-
its introduction of any extrinsic evidence to prove that he commit-
ted the crime. If the witness denies having committed the crime and
has not been convicted, the cross-examiner may do no more than
press the witness for an admission. 6
The reason for rule 608(b)'s general rule of exclusion is signifi-
cant: it is to avoid having the trier of fact decide whether the witness
engaged in particular conduct. The decision to exclude extrinsic
evidence of specific conduct for impeachment purposes reflects the
relative weights of the probative value of a witness's prior conduct
on the one hand and the burden imposed on the judicial process by
its presentation at trial on the other." Use of such evidence to im-
peach involves a two-step inference. Because the witness committed
the act in question, the trier of fact attributes to him a certain
character trait (untrustworthiness). From this trait the trier infers
that the witness's testimony is suspect. Since neither of these infer-
ences is compelling and since such evidence will generally be but
one minor element of the body of proof presented at trial, the proba-
tive value of this evidence is particularly low.
On the other side of the balance, the problems introduced by
adding the determination of the witness's conduct to the trial are
45 FED. R. EvD. 608(b). The rule requires that the actions be "probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness." Id.
"6 The cross-examiner may not attempt to rebut the denial with proof of the prior crime.
United States v. Turquitt, 557 F.2d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allende, 486
F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1973); United States v. Yarbrough, 352
F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1965); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1976). Nor may the cross-
examiner rebut the witness's denial through the use of questioning that strongly suggests
the-witness's guilt. See Watkins v. Foster, 570 F.2d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 1978); People v. Alamo,
23 N.Y.2d 630, 636-37, 246 N.E.2d 496, 499, 298 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685 (Burke, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969); State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 527, 82 S.E.2d 762, 768
(1954); Brooks, The Treatment of Witnesses in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts: Article IV, 25 Rac. A.B. Crry N.Y. 632, 636-37 (1970). With respect
to the court's broad discretion to prohibit this type of questioning, see 3 WEiNSTEIm's Evi-
DENCE, supra note 6, 608[05], at 22-24.
7 See Hale, Specific Acts and Related Matters as Affecting Credibility, 1 HASTINGS L.J.
89 (1950).
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threefold.48 First, to allow the parties to introduce evidence regard-
ing a witness's conduct would significantly prolong the trial. In
particular, relitigation of a prior finding of guilt would involve du-
plicative and wasteful use of judicial resources. Second, injection
into the trial of a question distinct from that which must ultimately
be decided could cause the jury to confuse the issues and proof
raised in the course of the trial. Finally, the witness, or the party
relying on his testimony, might not have anticipated that the other
party would introduce evidence of specific actions as a means of
impeachment." Because of the relatively low probative value of this
type of evidence and the substantial potential for delay, confusion,
and surprise entailed by its presentation, rule 608(b) avoids having
the factfinder decide at trial whether the witness committed a crime
raised to impeach.
2. Rule 609(a). Where a witness has been convicted of a crime,
rule 609(a) provides an exception to rule 608(b) by allowing admis-
sion of the public record of the conviction that conclusively estab-
lishes the witness's commisson of the crime.50 Because rule 608(b)
prohibits extrinsic evidence in support of a witness's credibility,
thus apparently preventing the challenged witness from rebutting
the conviction, the trier of fact faces positive proof on only one side
of the issue.5 1 The only reasonable conclusion that the trier can
reach, therefore, is that the witness committed the crime for which
he was convicted. The precise role of a conviction is thus to allow
" See Lee v. United States, 368 F.2d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally 3A J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 979, at 826-27; Ladd, supra note 9, at 507-09.
" Surprise may result because the witness forgot the event, because he did not consider
it a serious indication of untrustworthiness, or because the evidence of the action is false and
misleading. The party relying on the witness might then be caught unprepared to challenge
the foundation, competency, or strength of the evidence or to offer evidence of his own on
the issue of the witness's past actions. His opponent could easily take advantage of his
unpreparedness and score an unfair but successful attack on the credibility of the witness.
11 The exception accords with pre-rules federal-court practice, see United States v.
Plante, 472 F.2d 829, 832 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1973), as well as with the
practice in state courts, see Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. 2d 103, 108, 210
N.E.2d 191, 194-95 (1965); Morrissey v. Powell, 304 Mass. 268, 272, 23 N.E.2d 411, 414 (1939)
(dictum); Lamoureux v. New York, N.H.&H.R.R., 169 Mass. 338, 340, 47 N.E. 1009, 1010
(1897) (Holmes, J.); Commonwealth v. Palarino, 168 Pa. Super. 152, 157, 77 A.2d 665, 667
(1951); State v. Harra, 22 Wash. 57, 60, 60 P. 58, 59 (1900).
11 Some courts allow an impeached witness to give a brief explanation of the conviction
for the purpose of denying guilt or mitigating the impact of proof of prior crime. United States
v. Crisafi, 304 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1962). But see Lamoureux v. New York N.H.&H.R.R.,
169 Mass. 338, 340, 47 N.E. 1009, 1010 (1897) (not error for trial court to prohibit witness's
explanation of extenuating circumstances). McCormick explains that the reason for this
practice is to "satisfy our feeling that some reasonable outlet for the instinct of self-defense
by one attacked should be conceded, if it can be done without too much damage to the
business at hand." HADBOOK, supra note 8, § 43, at 89.
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proof when the witness denies committing the crime. A party may
still challenge the suggested inferences of his witness's untrustwor-
thiness, 52 but the conviction settles the question of the witness's
prior criminal acts.
By treating a conviction as conclusive proof of a witness's prior
crime, rule 609(a) avoids the problems that underlie rule 608(b)'s
rule of exclusion. 3 The introduction of a witness's conviction to
prove his prior crimes raises no likelihood of delaying the trial or
confusing the issues. Furthermore, since a party may not challenge
the finding of guilt in a conviction used to impeach one of his wit-
nesses, that he might be unprepared to do so is of no significance.
Thus, the conclusiveness of a conviction under rule 609(a) achieves
two otherwise inconsistent objectives: the issue of the witness's prior
crime is not litigated and evidence of the prior crime, which does
have some probative value, is nonetheless available to impeach the
witness at trial.
B. The Justification for Conclusive Use of Convictions
The conclusiveness accorded to a conviction as evidence of a
witness's prior crime under rule 609(a) is not a necessary conse-
quence of the verdict or judgment in the prior trial;54 rule 609(a)
applies a prior conviction as conclusive proof of guilt in many cases
in which collateral estoppel normally would not preclude relitiga-
tion of the prior crime. 55 Conclusiveness as a feature of proof by prior
Extrinsic proof admissible to rehabilitate the witness is limited to evidence of his
character for truthfulness in the form of opinion or reputation. FED. R. Evm. 608(a).
See generally 3A J. WiGMORE, supra note 1, § 980, at 828. Surprise is not a factor, since
both the witness and the party relying on his testimony may reasonably be presumed to know
of any prior convictions.
See generally 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.412[1] (2d ed. 1965).
For example, courts have traditionally applied a requirement of mutuality to collateral
estoppel. Only a party or privy to a prior judgment could use it to preclude an issue in a
subsequent case. With criminal convictions, this generally limited the benefit of collateral
estoppel to the prosecuting government. See M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 243 F. Supp.
806, 813 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 218, 7 N.E.2d 601, 601 (1937). Not
even the earliest cases, however, restricted impeachment use of convictions to the prosecuting
government. See, e.g., Hackett v. Freeman & Graves, 103 Iowa 296, 298, 72 N.W. 528, 529
(1897); Lamoureux v. New York, N.H.&H.R.R., 169 Mass. 338, 340, 47 N.E. 1009, 1010
(1897). A second example regards the parties barred by collateral estoppel. Since collateral
estoppel does not bar an attack on a judgment by a litigant who was not a party or privy to
the prior judgment, the doctrine would not bar a party from attacking a conviction used to
impeach a coparty or nonparty witness. Artrip v. Califano, 569 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 453 (D.D.C. 1978); Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942). In spite of these
discrepancies with respect to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, impeachment use of convic-
tion evidence applies without regard to whether the party affected by the proof had any
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conviction appears to result not from an inherent characteristic of
convictions, but rather from the utility of a conviction to prove a
prior crime without the use of judicial resources required to put the
witness's commission of the crime into issue.56 Yet, the utility of
making the conviction conclusive proof does not fully respond to the
argument that this treatment of a conviction is unfair to the party
relying either on his own testimony or that of a witness who is
subjected to impeachment. If the trier of fact accepts that the wit-
ness committed the prior crime, this party could suffer an adverse
judgment due either to the discrediting of important testimony or
the development of jury prejudice. The party's right to a fair trial
seems to demand that some justification be given for denying him
an opportunity to challenge his opponent's proof on what could be
a decisive issue.
The justification for precluding extrinsic rebuttal evidence can-
not be the same as the explanation for precluding the relitigation
of issues under collateral estoppel-that a party had a full oppor-
tunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding57-since rule
609(a) applies as well to those situations in which the affected party
had no opportunity to litigate the issue of his witness's guilt. Nor is
it sufficient to argue that since the probative value of prior-crime
impeachment evidence is so low, the party is unlikely to be harmed
even if the impeaching conviction was incorrect. That prior-crime
evidence is admissible indicates that it is believed to be relevant;
hence it is possible that it will be outcome-determinative in a close
case."' A party should not have to bear an adverse verdict without
an opportunity to contest evidence that determined the outcome.
The only acceptable justification for the total preclusion of re-
buttal evidence under rule 609(a) is the reliability of the finding of
guilt in the prior proceeding. Although a conviction can never be
considered absolute proof of guilt, it is sufficiently reliable to make
opportunity to participate in the prior criminal trial. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 526
F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 905 (1976). See also note 73 infra.
" See United States v. Plante, 472 F.2d 829, 832 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950
(1973) (The "statement that the conviction is 'conclusive'. .. merely states the rule, not the
reason.").
57 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of IlI. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
328-29 (1971); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110-11 (1969).
"A verdict may depend on a jury's decision whether to believe a particular witness. See
Brown v. Coating Specialists, Inc., 465 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff's only eyewitness
was a convicted felon). The University of Chicago jury project found that in 25 percent of
the cases they surveyed, the defense called just one witness. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra
note 8, at 136. Although many of these cases do not involve witnesses whose testimony is
singularly crucial to the defense, the large figure indicates that the cases in which it is crucial
are probably not rare.
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this explanation valid. The primary element of reliability is the
burden of proof: the conviction represents a jury's conclusion that
evidence proves the witness's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 9
Furthermore, the criminal trial contains numerous safeguards de-
signed to ensure that the evidence actually satisfies this burden. If
the trial proceeded in accordance with the rules of evidence and
procedure and the requirements of the fifth and sixth amendments,
then a subsequent court can reasonably assume that the finding of
guilt was based on competent and sufficient evidence and that the
accused had a fair opportunity to refute the charges against him. By
requiring a conviction for the prior crime, rule 609(a) thus restricts
the evidence of the crime to a form that has a high degree of cer-
tainty and that a party would be unlikely to refute if given the
opportunity. 0
This explanation of the fairness of rule 609(a) implies that if
convictions are to be admitted as impeaching evidence, reliability
should be the basic criterion of the definition of "conviction" for the
purposes of the rule. If a conviction does not represent a reliable
determination of a witness's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then
the possibility would not be remote that a party could successfully
challenge an attempt to prove the prior crimes of his witnesses. In
these circumstances, to allow evidence of the prior crimes but to
prohibit any effective challenge to the evidence would be unjust to
the adversely affected party. Since it is the policy of the Federal
5, Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970).
0 Indeed, if the criminal trial properly found the witness guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, then the evidence of guilt would substantially exceed the burden that a party would
have to meet if rule 608(b) generally permitted extrinsic proof of a witness's prior crimes.
Normally, when a litigant offers proof of prior criminal acts as circumstantial evidence of an
alleged fact, the proof of the prior crime must satisfy a burden no greater than clear and
convincing proof. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 234-35 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 923 (1977); United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1974);
State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1972); Caruthers v. State, 219 Tenn. 21, 406 S.W.2d
159 (1966). In many jurisdictions, the burden is even lower. The Second Circuit requires only
proof of the prior crime by preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Kahan, 572 F.2d
923, 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 112 (1978); United States v.'Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076,
1090-91 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). See also People v. McClellan, 71
Cal. 2d 793, 804, 457 P.2d 871, 878, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31, 38 (1969). The Fifth Circuit has recently
ruled that proof of prior crimes is admissible if it merely allows a reasonable inference that
the witness committed the prior crime. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 909-13 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc). See also MacEwen v. State, 194 Md. 492, 502, 71 A.2d 464, 468 (1950).
Thus, a valid conviction represents evidence that, if offered in the second trial to im-
peach the witness, would almost surely satisfy the requisite burden of proof. It is reasonable
to conclude, therefore, that when a witness has been convicted, the chance that a party
relying on his testimony could successfully challenge the proof of the prior crime is remote.
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Rules of Evidence to avoid litigating the issue of a witness's prior
crime, the alternative in any case in which reliability is not assured
is to exclude the prior crime evidence.
III. THE PROBLEM OF IMPEACHMENT WITH A CONVICTION PENDING
APPEAL
The only reason consistent with the policy underlying rule
609(a) that an appeal might render a conviction inadmissible is the
possibility of reversal after its use to impeach." Once a conviction
has been reversed, it may not be used to impeach a witness."2 The
common explanation of this rule is formal: the reversal removes the
conviction from existence. As the Supreme Court of Washington
recently explained, a conviction that has been reversed has been
"voided and [stands] for naught."63 If only the formal status of a
conviction is relevant, the pendency of an appeal raises no serious
problems. There is no apparent inconsistency in saying that a per-
son stands convicted before reversal but not after it.
In many cases, however, the appellate court will reverse for
errors that reduce the reliability of the finding of guilt in the trial
court. 4 For example, the appellate court might rule that the evi-
" One group of cases holding convictions inadmissible during the pendency of an appeal,
see, for example, Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949), based their hold-
ings directly on the possibility of subsequent reversal. See text -and notes at notes 33-37
supra. Even those state court decisions that arrived at a rule of exclusion by reasoning that
a conviction is not technically a final judgment until exhaustion of an appeal indirectly
resulted from the possibility of reversal. See Foure v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 620, 628, 283
S.W. 958, 962 (1926).
'z United States v. Savage, 470 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 930
(1973); Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Card v. Foot, 57 Conn.
427, 432, 18 A. 713, 713 (1889); Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212, 215 (D.C. App. 1976);
People v. Miller, 27 Ill. App. 3d 788, 791, 327 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
925 (1976); Kable v. State, 17 Md. App. 16, 299 A.2d 493, 501 (1973); State v. Blevins, 425
S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. 1968); Poore v. State, 524 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). But
see Manning v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 367, 370, 123 P. 1029, 1030 (1912).
3 State v. Hill, 83 Wash. 2d 548, 561, 520 P.2d 618, 619-20 (1974). Compare the effect of
releasing a prisoner on a habeas corpus petition upon the status of his conviction. The Third
Circuit has held that release on habeas "does not have the force and effect of voiding a
conviction" and hence does not automatically render the conviction inadmissible for purposes
of impeachment. Smith v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140, 1147 (3d Cir. 1973). Rather, the court viewed
release on habeas corpus as equivalent to a pardon or annulment, which renders the convic-
tion inadmissible only if it is "based on a finding of innocence." Id. at 1147; accord, State v.
Kiser, 111 Ariz. 316, 317-18, 529 P.2d 215, 216-17 (1974). See FED. R. EviD. 609(c). But see
People v. Shook, 35 Ill. 2d 597, 600, 221 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1966) ("discharge by habeas corpus
refers to the actual conviction and declares it to be void").
" Because a conviction is nevertheless inadmissible after reversal for formal reasons, no
court has yet considered the effect of a reversal in reducing reliability. On a related issue,
courts have considered the effect of various constitutional errors on the reliability of a convic-
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dence produced at trial was insufficient to support the verdict, find-
ing that no reasonable juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.'5 The court might also reverse for various errors that reduce
to a lesser degree the reliability of the finding of guilt in the prior
proceeding.6 These errors include admission of hearsay or prejudi-
cial evidence, improper exclusion of evidence offered by the ac-
cused, and violations of procedural requirements, such as adequate
counsel for the accused, that protect the defendant's ability to
mount an effective defense. Some grounds for reversal, however,
raise no doubts about the correctness of the finding of guilt. The
clearest example is reversal due to admission of evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment. The purpose of reversal in
fourth amendment cases is not to ensure a correct verdict but to
discourage police violation of the rules on search and seizure." With
the exception of cases involving issues like the fourth amendment, 8
though, a reversal of a conviction constitutes a determination that
the prior proceeding did not find guilt with a sufficient degree of
certainty.
The possibility that any conviction introduced during the pen-
dency of an appeal will eventually prove unreliable is small, but not
insignificant. In the United States courts of appeals, the rate of
reversal of criminal convictions that are appealed is somewhat
greater than ten percent." Reversals by the appellate courts of most
states occur at similar rates." Some of these reversals, of course, are
for fourth amendment violations and other errors that do not reduce
reliability. Statistics on these reversals are not available, but a con-
tion when the issue is whether impeachment of a criminal defendant with a constitutionally
defective prior conviction constitutes reversible error. Compare United States v. Penta, 475
F.2d 92 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973), with Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
,1 See United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 93
(1978).
" But even here a reversal indicates that the error reduced the reliability of the convic-
tion below the "beyond a reasonable doubt" threshold. If it had not, it would have been
dismissed as "harmless error" and the conviction would not have been reversed. Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444-45 (1949).
11 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976); see United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92,
94 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973); State v. Murray, 86 Wash. 2d 165, 168, 543
P.2d 332, 334 (1975).
" Other examples of grounds for reversal that do not question the correctness of the
finding of guilt are prosecutions in violation of the double jeopardy clause and admission of
evidence that violates a privileged communication. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
793-97 (1969) (double jeopardy); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)
(privileged communications).
1[1978] AD MIN. OFFICE OF TM U.S. Cou'Rs ANN. REP A-3 to A-5.
7 See, e.g., [1976] ADINm. OFFICE OF THE ILL. CouRTs ANN. REP. 97 (approximately 10
percent reversed by appellate courts); [1978] ADbIN. CouRT OF THE CAL. CoURrs ANN. 11EP.
72 (approximately 8 percent reversed by appellate and supreme courts).
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servative estimate would be that of the convictions used to impeach
while an appeal is pending, some number between five and ten
percent will ultimately be reversed for errors that reduce reliability.
Reversals on grounds of unreliability do not establish the inno-
cence of the person convicted in the lower court. Most likely, sub-
stantial evidence of guilt will remain.71 The problem with permitting
impeachment with a conviction that has been, or will be, reversed
on grounds of unreliability is that the reversal removes the basis for
justifying the treatment of the conviction as conclusive proof of the
prior crime. If the evidence produced at the first trial does not prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or if the convicted person did not
have the benefit of normal procedural and evidentiary safeguards,
then the conviction does not represent proof of guilt of the same high
degree of certainty as a conviction free of these defects. To be sure,
the deficiency might be trivial and the likelihood remote that a
litigant who would wish to challenge the proof of his witness's prior
crimes could do so successfully. But the deficiency could be sub-
stantial, and the evidence produced at the prior trial could be in-
sufficient to foreclose effectively the possibility that a litigant could
successfully challenge an attempt to prove his witness's prior
crimes. In these latter cases, there is a significant element of unfair-
ness in using the conviction to establish conclusively against a liti-
gant the fact of a prior crime of his witness.7 1 Convictions reversed
1 The reversals at issue here are ones that did not result in a second conviction or remand
of the case. If the unreliable conviction is merely replaced with a reliable one, use of the first
conviction as proof of guilt should cause no problems. See United States v. Cipullo, 170 F.2d
311, 313 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 946 (1949).
72 The unfairness considered here is similar to the due process violation found in Loper
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). The trial court had allowed impeachment of a criminal defen-
dant with a prior convicton for which the defendant had not been provided assistance of
counsel, but which had never been set aside or revoked. The Supreme Court concluded that
since the use of the conviction to impeach could have affected the outcome of the trial, the
trial court erred in permitting it. 405 U.S. at 480, 483-84. The basis of the Court's reasoning
in Loper was the lack of reliability of a conviction obtained without the aid of counsel. Since
a criminal defendant has a right, guaranteed by due process, to certain procedures which
serve to ensure that the jury's finding of guilt will be based on a fair trial, the defendant ought
not be deprived of this right indirectly by the establishment of facts against him with the
findings of a prior trial in which he was denied the benefits of these procedures. The due
process right announced in Loper overlaps the concept of fairness under rule 609(a). Once a
conviction has been reversed on the ground of failure to provide the accused with counsel or
of denial of another constitutional right tied to reliability, use of the conviction in a subse-
quent trial to impeach a criminal defendant would violate both the due process right an-
nounced in Loper and the limitation on convictions admissible and under rule 609(a) dis-
cussed here.
The two concepts are not equivalent, however. In one respect, the Loper rule applies more
broadly. As in Loper itself, the constitutional error need not have resulted in reversal of the
conviction. Rather, the court considering admissibility of the conviction to impeach must
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on grounds of unreliability, therefore, do not constitute a class of
cases that meet the threshold of reliability required for use under
rule 609(a).
In summary, the problem caused by impeachment with a con-
viction during the pendency of an appeal results from the inevitable
reversal of some of the convictions for errors that reduce the reliabil-
ity of the finding of guilt. When such a reversal occurs after the use
of the conviction to obtain a judgment in a second trial, the party
who suffers the impeachment of his or his witness's testimony can
reasonably argue that the admission of the conviction as conclusive
proof was unfair and that the judgment against him is unjust. 3 The
question that remains is how best to protect or vindicate the interest
of this aggrieved party.
IV. RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF SUBSEQUENT REVERSAL
Rule 609(e) reflects Congress's judgment that the evidentiary
value of a conviction pending appeal outweighs the apparent unfair-
ness to a party who suffers an adverse judgment due to impeach-
ment with a conviction subsequently reversed on grounds of unrelia-
bility. 4 The obvious interest served in admitting the convictions is
inspect the record of the prior proceeding to determine whether even unappealed constitu-
tional errors occurred. See 3 WEINSTEN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 6, 609[071, at 93. In most
respects, though, the reliability limitation of rule 609(a) applies more broadly. First, Loper
was an exercise in constitutional rulemaking and might only apply to constitutional errors in
the prior proceeding. The reliability requirement of a conviction under rule 609(a), on the
other hand, is an interpretation of the rule. No reason exists to limit its application to
convictions that are unreliable due to constitutional error. Second, Loper concerns the due
process rights of criminal defendants whereas the interpretation of rule 609(a) concerns fair-
ness to any litigant adversely affected by impeachment with evidence of conviction. Thus,
the similarity between the two notions begins and ends with the general notion that a convic-
tion used to impeach should satisfy a high threshold of reliability. Cf. Glick, supra note 16,
at 347-49 (suggesting that the rule eventually announced in Loper be incorporated into rule
609(e)).
" The effect would be the same if consideration were limited to cases in which the person
convicted is himself the impeached witness and affected party in the subsequent trial and if
the justification for conclusiveness were the application of collateral estoppel. See notes 55
& 57 supra. When an appellate court reverses on grounds of insufficient evidence or trial error,
which reduce the reliability of the finding of guilt, the claim that the affected party had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding has no merit. See
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 651 (1979) (A court may use its discretion
to deny collateral estoppel "where the second action affords the defendant procedural oppor-
tunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result.") (footnote
omitted).
71 Recall that the advisory note explicitly rejected the holding of Campbell v. United
States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949), which reasoned that the possibility of subsequent
reversal compelled a rule of exclusion. FED. R. EvID. 609(e), Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D.
183, 272 (1973). See text and notes at notes 34-36, 38 supra.
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the benefit of evidence relevant to the issue of a witness's credibil-
ity.75 Two considerations enhance the interest in admitting convic-
tions pending appeal. First, Congress adopted a form of rule 609(a)
that is substantially less restrictive than others urged upon it and
thus expresses a generally favorable attitude toward admission of
this evidence. 7 Second, convictions pending appeal will generally be
more probative of credibility than unappealed convictions, since in
most cases they will prove recent crimes.77
Recognizing the value of admitting the evidence, however, does
not correct the unfairness of impeachment with unreliable convic-
tions when it occurs.78 The explanation for rule 609(e) may be that
this cost to some defendants must be tolerated in order to derive the
benefits of conviction evidence. But the explanation might also be
that means other than a general rule of exclusion are available to
resolve the problem. There are at least three possible solutions:
informing the jury of the pendency of an appeal, excluding the
evidence under rule 609(a)(1), and granting a new trial when a
conviction is reversed. Any of these, if it substantially compensates
for the risk of unfairness, might justify Congress's decision to eschew
a blanket rule against admitting convictions pending appeal for
impeachment purposes.7 9
" See text and note at note 12 supra.
78 See H.R. RP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973); S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1974). See also United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 358 & n.20, 359 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
7 See United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1027
(1973) (Friendly, J.).
71 Some courts have refused to set aside a judgment obtained with the aid of a conviction
pending appeal, even though the conviction has since been reversed. Since the witness did
stand convicted at the time of the impeachment, they reason, no relief is necessary when
reversal actually occurs. Bloch v. United States, 238 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 959 (1957); Latikos v. State, 17 Ala. App. 655, 656, 88 So. 47, 48 (1921); People v.
Braun, 14 Cal. 2d 1, 6, 92 P.2d 402, 405 (1939); People v. Miller, 27 Ill. App. 3d 788, 791-92,
327 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 925 (1976); Nicholson v. State, 254 So. 2d
881, 883-84 (Miss. 1971); State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 12-13, 206 P. 717, 719-20 (1922). But
see United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 107-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1027 (1973);
State v. Kiser, 111 Ariz. 316, 317, 529 P.2d 215, 216 (1974). This reasoning might apply to
the effect of a reversal in removing the formal status of conviction but it is inapplicable to
the effect of finding a conviction inadequately reliable. If an appellate court finds that the
witness's conviction was based on insufficient evidence or that trial errors in the prior pro-
ceeding reduced its reliability, it has found a defect that reaches reliability before as well as
after the appellate court decision.
1, An additional argument against a blanket rule is that it might encourage parties
wishing to avoid impeachment in subsequent trials to file frivolous appeals. Judge Friendly,
for one, has noted this possibility. United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1027 (1973).
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A. Informing the Jury of the Pendency of the Appeal
The first solution derives from rule 609(e) itself. The rule pro-
vides that "[e]vidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissi-
ble.""0 Several states also specifically permit informing the jury of
a pending appeal.81 When Congress earlier enacted a comparable
provision in the District of Columbia Code, it expressed the belief
that the jury's knowledge of a pending appeal eliminates "any po-
tential question of reversal in the event the conviction used as im-
peachment is reversed on appeal." 82 The jury's knowledge of the
appeal cannot reasonably be expected to have this corrective effect,
however. Before a jury member can make use of the evidence, either
to judge a witness's credibility or to develop a bias against a party,
he must decide whether the witness committed the crime for which
he was convicted. The totality of the evidence on which he must
base this decision is the conviction and the appeal. The appeal
represents a finite, but small probability that the jury or court in
the prior criminal proceeding erred." Unless the jury member has a
grandly exaggerated conception of the possibility of reversal or of
erroneous conviction, 4 his only reasonable conclusion is that the
witness committed the crime, and the juror will draw inferences
based on this conclusion.
The jury's knowledge of the appeal, if rationally applied, will
thus have no effect on its use of conviction evidence. The most that
can be said for informing the jury of the appeal is that it cautions
the members to draw inferences of dishonesty from the prior crime
with some degree of skepticism. So long as the evidence of convic-
tion can influence the outcome of a trial, however-and presumably
it would not be admissible unless it could-the possibility remains
that a party may suffer an adverse judgment due to impeachment
of his witnesses or himself with a conviction that is subsequently
reversed.85
" FED. R. EvID. 609(e). The Fifth Circuit recognized this privilege just prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence: "[Tihe defense may show that which is also a
fact-the conviction is on appeal and, as any average juror would know, may be set aside."
United States v. Franicevich, 471 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1973).
81 People v. Bey, 42 IIl. 2d 139, 146, 246 N.E.2d 287, 291 (1969); State v. Waller, 11 N.C.
App. 434, 435, 181 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1971). See also D.C. CODE § 14-305(d) (Supp. V 1972).
Si H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1970) The Advisory Note to the federal
rule says only: "The pendency of an appeal is, however, a qualifying circumstance properly
considerable." FED. R. EvID. 609(e), Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 272 (1973). See
text and notes at notes 69-72 supra.
" One critic of rule 609(e) suggests that the laymen of the jury probably view an appeal
"as a technical device having little relation to guilt or innocence." Glick, supra note 16, at
347.
85 Although jurors may often be wrong in their evaluation of circumstantial evidence, use
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B. Exclusion Under Rule 609(a)(1)
A second solution to the problem of subsequent reversal is for
the trial court to exclude evidence of conviction whenever rule
609(a) would permit exclusion. In the case of impeachment with
conviction for crimes not involving dishonesty or false statement,
the trial court may exclude a conviction when the risk of prejudice
to the defendant outweighs probative value.8 Whenever an appeal
raises the possibility of reversal on grounds of unreliability, it in-
creases the possibility that the conviction is erroneous and that the
witness did not commit the crime that is offered to prove his dishon-
esty. As this latter possibility increases, the overall probative value
of the conviction as circumstantial proof of the witness's sincerity
declines. In some cases the effect of this decline in probative value
may be to tip the balance between prejudice and probative value
against admissibility. Hence, the problem of subsequent reversals
might be avoided altogether by exclusion of the evidence.81
The problem with this suggestion is that the trial court's bal-
ancing would allow it to exclude only a fraction of the convictions
that are appealed on reliability grounds. First, rule 609(a) does not
authorize the trial court to balance prejudice and probative value
for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.81 Second, even
when the trial court has discretion to exclude convictions, it could
not reasonably find that an appeal raising issues of reliability
greatly reduces the probative value of the conviction evidence. As
noted, only about ten percent of appeals result in reversal, 89 and a
reversal establishes only that the prosecution did not prove guilt
fairly and beyond a reasonable doubt. Only a fraction of these rever-
sals represent actually erroneous convictions. An appeal, therefore,
would only marginally increase the probability of erroneous convic-
tion. It would have the effect of rendering a conviction inadmissible
only when probative value and prejudice are otherwise closely in
balance.
When cases arise in which the trial court does have discretion
to exclude a conviction, the judge should examine the record of the
of convictions as circumstantial evidence is distinguishable because the party does not nor-
mally have an opportunity to offer evidence to challenge the reliability of the conviction.
U FED. R. Evit. 609(a)(1).
" Although rule 609(e) does state that an appeal "does not render evidence of a convic-
tion inadmissible," the rule can be read as only rejecting a blanket rule excluding all convic-
tions pending appeal, not as precluding use of pendency as a factor in making individual
decisions to exclude under rule 609(a)(1).
U FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2).
" See text and notes at notes 69-70 supra.
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first trial. He may conclude that there is a reasonable chance for
reversal on reliability grounds. Since the evidence in these cases is
already on the borderline of admissibility, the interest in admitting
it is not especially strong. If the courts are sensitive to the problems
that attend the reversal of a conviction used to impeach, they
should use their discretion to exclude the conviction.
C. New Trial
The third solution to the problem of subsequent reversals is to
grant a new trial. The unfairness presented in the case of a subse-
quent reversal is the adverse judgment in the second trial: an appel-
late court has determined that the prior conviction is insufficiently
reliable to use to impeach a witness, but the second judgment,
obtained with the use of the now overturned prior conviction, re-
mains. The new-trial remedy deals with this problem by setting
aside the second judgment.
In order to respond satisfactorily to the problem of subsequent
reversal, the new-trial remedy need not be automatic. If the convic-
tion did not influence the outcome of the trial in which it was used
to impeach-which will be true in the majority of cases-then no
claim of unfairness can arise. Impeachment of a party's witness, or
of a party himself, can lead to an adverse judgment in one of two
ways: the impeachment may successfully discredit testimony neces-
sary for the party's case," or it may cause the jury to develop a bias
against the party.91 The task of determining whether use of a convic-
tion influenced the outcome of a trial is much like applying the
" Typically, the discrediting effect will not be a critical aspect of the trial. The jury may
well give greater weight to other means of impeachment, such as contradictions or suspicious
demeanor elicited on cross-examination. Moreover, the outcome of a trial will seldom rest
alone, or in large part, on the jury's belief of one witness. The case is not inconceivable,
however, in which the jury's verdict depends on its willingness to believe one witness. For
example, in a trial to determine fault for an automobile accident, a party may have a single
eye-witness to support his allegations. He will lose the case if his opponent persuades the jury
to disbelieve his witness on the basis of a prior conviction.
"1 As noted, this is primarily, although not exclusively, a problem that arises with the
impeachment of criminal defendants. See note 8 supra. The University of Chicago jury
project, H. KALVEN & H. ZEisEL, supra note 8, demonstrated a serious danger that the jury
will use the conviction to judge not only the defendant's credibility but his guilt as well. Id.
at 159-60. The project also demonstrated that defendants often forgo testifying in their own
behalf in order to avoid subjecting themselves to impeachment with a possibly prejudicial
conviction. Id. at 146. Failure to take the stand could be harmful to a defendant whose case
could be greatly enhanced with the addition of his own testimony. See United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Paige, 464 F. Supp. 99, 101 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (defendant's "defense will be prejudiced severely if he is deterred from testifying
from fear that he will be convicted on the basis of a prior crime") (citing Suggs v. United
States, 391 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
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harmless-error test to trial errors.2 A court could conclude that a
subsequently reversed conviction did not have prejudicial effects by
viewing the trial record for evidence that other means of impeach-
ment substantially discredited the witness's testimony or that no
significant possibility of jury prejudice existed. The consequence of
limiting the new trial remedy in this manner is to restrict its use to
setting aside only those judgments that are subject to an actual
claim of unfairness based on impeachment with unreliable convic-
tions.
This solution has one obvious drawback: it requires a new trial.
A second trial can be expensive and emotionally taxing for the liti-
gants, and it requires the expenditure of additional judicial re-
sources. In some cases, a trial court can prevent these burdens by
staying its proceedings until completion of an appeal on the convic-
tion of a witness. 3 For those cases in which a stay would not prevent
the need for a new trial, the burden of relitigation does not appear
to be an adequate reason for denying relief altogether. The party
who suffers impeachment and loses a trial as a result would cer-
tainly prefer the option to relitigate the case. The burden cannot be
too great for the prevailing party, since courts regularly set aside
judgments for closely analogous defects, as when unreliable hearsay
evidence has been admitted. Finally, the burden on the judicial
system would not be great since a new trial would be required in
only a small percentage of cases. 5
As a solution to the problem of subsequent reversals, the new
trial remedy is preferable to a rule excluding convictions pending
appeal from use as impeachment evidence. The new trial remedy
12 See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 61820 (1953); Campbell v. United States,
176 F.2d 45, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See generally Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
763-65 (1946). In civil trials, a court will generally hold harmless any erroneous admission of
evidence when the evidence does not appear to have substantially contributed to the outcome
of the trial. Lenz v. Southern Pacific Co., 493 F.2d 471, 472 (5th Cir. 1974); Hoffman v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 1973).
,1 A trial court has wide discretion to stay its proceeding, pending the outcome of a
separate proceeding, in the interest of the economy of the time and effort of both the court
and the parties. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1936); CMAX, Inc. v. Hall,
300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1972); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Sperberg, 63 F.R.D. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
When the admission of a witness's conviction could have a significant effect in determining
the outcome of a trial, and when awaiting the outcome of an appeal of a conviction would
not unfairly burden the parties, the trial court would have sufficient reason to issue a stay
and thus avoid any need for a second trial should the appeal result in a reversal. One problem
with this approach, as with a blanket rule of exclusion, is that it encourages parties to make
frivolous appeals in order to delay, perhaps indefinitely, their subsequent trials.
" See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Ragano, 476 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1973).
" See text and notes at notes 69-70 supra.
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would serve the interest of admitting this evidence, which the
draftsmen of rule 609 deemed relevant;96 the only advantage to a
rule of exclusion is the avoidance of the costs of new trials. Since
the new-trial remedy would not require a substantial number of new
trials,97 it seems preferable.
Whether the advantages of the new-trial remedy can serve as a
rationale for rule 609(e) depends upon the extent of its availability.
Although only one panel of the Second Circuit98 and the Supreme
Court of Arizona99 have recognized a right to a new trial in cases in
which a conviction used to impeach has subsequently been re-
versed,0 0 a federal court's authority to grant a new trial seems broad
enough to cover those cases in which it is possible to make post-
verdict motions to the trial court. A federal court may, in criminal
cases, grant a new trial whenever it is "in the interest of justice"'' 1
to do so. A court's discretion to remedy injustice should reasonably
extend to a claim of a party who was unable to challenge critical
evidence that is later proven unreliable. In civil cases, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allow new trials for any of the reasons for
which new trials have traditionally been granted.102 Although the
specific case of reversal of a conviction used to impeach is without
precedent in the federal courts, it is closely analogous to cases in
which new trials are regularly granted. 0 3 Since trial courts may
grant new trials in cases involving unreliable evidence and reversal
of judgments used as conclusive proof at trial, they should also have
that authority in the case of reversal of a conviction used to im-
peach. Thus, in any case-criminal or civil-in which reversal oc-
curs in time for a party to file a post-verdict motion, the trial court
would have authority to grant a new trial.
The grounds for granting a new trial based upon a post-verdict
motion do not apply in every case in which relief might be war-
" See text and notes at notes 75-77 supra.
" See text and note at note 70 supra.
" United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 107-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1027
(1973).
, State v. Kiser, 111 Ariz. 316, 529 P.2d 215, 216 (1974).
'® Several courts have rejected the right to a new trial on the reasoning that since the
witness stood convicted at the time he was impeached, the reversal presents no problems that
requires a remedy. See note 78 supra.
" FED. R. CRmI. P. 33.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
" A court may grant a new trial if it previously allowed highly unreliable hearsay
evidence to reach the jury. See United States v. Campanaro, 63 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Pa.
1945). Grounds for new trial also exist when a prior judgment that precluded relitigation of
issues at trial has since been reversed. Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 240 (1891).
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ranted.0 4 The rules of procedure impose strict time limits on post-
verdict motions: such motions must be made within seven days of
the jury's verdict in criminal cases'0 5 and within ten days of entry
of judgment in civil cases.' The grounds for granting a new trial
*after expiration of these periods are more restrictive.
Of the recognized grounds for granting new trials after expira-
tion of the time for post-trial motions, the one most likely to support
a new trial in the reversal cases is newly discovered evidence. 0 The
reversal of a prior conviction is not new evidence in the sense that
it is evidence a jury would consider in a second trial. It is, however,
new evidence that a judge would consider in his ruling on the admis-
sibility of a witness's conviction. 08 The reversal may establish that
the conviction is not a sufficiently reliable finding of guilt to satisfy
the requirements of rule 609(a).'
Two restrictions on the newly discovered evidence motion limit
its availability. First, a party must file the motion within two years
in criminal trials, 10 and within one year in civil trials.", Although
these time periods are substantial, the appellate process is not so
speedy that reversals will always occur within the time permitted
to file a motion for a new trial.12 Second, the moving party must
show that in a new trial, the exclusion of a witness's conviction
'" The new trial remedy might also be unavailable due to an exercise of the court's
discretion to deny a motion for a new trial when it would not be "in the interests of justice."
FED. R. CRmp. P. 33. See 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.19 (2d ed. 1971) (civil trials); 2 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 551, 556 (1969) (criminal trials). The court might
find that the burden of a new trial in a particular case would be unusually great and that
this consideration outweighs the unfairness of the impeachment.
FED. R. Cram. P. 33.
1W FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
,, See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. In United States v. Soles, Judge
Friendly suggested that the reversal of a conviction used to impeach a criminal defendant
would constitute newly discovered evidence. 482 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1027 (1973).
IN The motion would be similar to a motion based on the recanting of testimony by one
witness. At least in criminal cases the court may order a new trial if it finds, by some degree
of probability, that the jury would have acquitted the defendant if the recanted testimony
had not been heard. United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1973). The courts disagree on what degree of probabil-
ity must be shown. See note 113 infra.
'H See text and notes at notes 64-68 supra.
0 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
1 During 1976, the Illinois courts of appeals decided 44 percent of criminal appeals
within one year of filing and 94 percent within two years of filing. [1976] ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE ILL. CouRTs. ANN. REP. 98. For criminal appeals in the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, the median lapse of time from the entry of a trial court judgment to an
appellate court decision was between seventeen and eighteen months. [1976-1977] ADMIN.
Din. OF THE N.J. CoURS ANN. REP. tables 1 & 1A, at B-27 to B-32.
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would probably lead to an acquittal in a criminal case"' or to a
different result in a civil case.1 This burden would not block a new
trial in those cases in which the reversal of a conviction used to
impeach leaves standing those judgments that seem most unfair-
cases in which the losing party would probably have prevailed had
not a conviction, now reversed, been used to impeach his or his
witness's testimony.
In less clear-cut cases some unfairness would remain, however.
A litigant may be able to prove that he probably lost a prior trial
because his opponent successfully discredited an important witness
with a prior conviction. Upon reversal of that conviction, he may be
unable to obtain a new trial because he is unable to prove the
further point that the jury would have believed his witness's testi-
mony. Moreover, a convicted person may show that he failed to
testify at his own trial because he feared the prejudicial effect of a
prior conviction since reversed. In order to obtain a new trial after
the reversal of the prior conviction, he must also prove that a jury
would believe his testimony and would acquit him after hearing it.
Thus, the newly discovered evidence motion offers only a partial
remedy to the problem of subsequent reversal."5
Nonetheless, the new-trial remedy appears to be available in a
substantial number of cases in which a subsequent reversal might
give rise to a claim of unfairness. To the extent that it is available,
there is no compelling reason for not permitting impeachment with
a conviction pending appeal. If a large number of cases warranting
relief are beyond the reach of the currently recognized grounds for
a new trial, an extension of these grounds would be preferable to a
general rule of exclusion. The present and potential availability of
the new trial remedy provides a reasonable justification for rule
609(e)'s rule of admissibility.
,,3 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 104, § 557. In the case of recanted testimony, the traditional
rule required a demonstration only that the jury might have acquitted without the testimony.
Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928). Recently some courts have aban-
doned this rule and have required a showing of probable acquittal. See United States v.
Stoksky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). Other courts
continue to follow the traditional rule. See United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th
Cir. 1976).
," 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.23[4], at 275 (2d ed. 1971).
"1 In an unusually serious case of unfairness, a court might consider a general collateral
attack on the prior judgment. In criminal cases resulting in imprisonment, the proper form
of attack would be a motion in the nature of habeas corpus. A collateral attack may be
grounded on nonconstitutional defects in exceptional circumstances. See Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). In civil cases, the court has the authority to set aside any prior
judgment, notwithstanding the absence of any recognized ground for a new trial, if it finds
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6).
[46:499
Impeachment by Prior Convictions
CONCLUSION
Rule 609(e) permits impeachment of a witness with a convic-
tion pending appeal, thus creating the possibility that a witness's
testimony may be discredited by a conviction subsequently reversed
on appeal. This possibility is troubling because the conviction is
treated as conclusive proof that the witness committed a particular
crime: its introduction allows the jury to draw inferences of untrust-
worthiness from the fact of the crime. Evidence of a conviction may
also introduce a danger of jury prejudice to the defendant. Because
the proof of the prior crime may, in some cases, have decisive conse-
quences on the outcome of a trial and because the conviction consti-
tutes conclusive proof, its use to impeach can only be justified on
the basis of the reliability of the finding of guilt underlying the
conviction. A reversal of the conviction undercuts this justification
because the grounds for reversal may be some defect that signifi-
cantly reduces the reliability of the finding of guilt. Although the
legislative history of rule 609 does not clearly reveal the actual in-
tentions of the draftsmen, the rationale that can be derived from a
reconsideration of the reasons for the rule suggests that, in at least
some cases of subsequent reversal, a new trial should be available.
Granting a new trial in appropriate cases, while remaining consis-
tent with the legislative decision to allow impeachment with convic-
tions pending appeal, adequately resolves the problems associated
with such a practice.
Emile Karafiol
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